Abstract
According to Michael Smith, to be motivated is to have a goal. To have a goal is to be in a mental state with which the world must fit. And to be in such a mental state is just to desire. This simple argument reveals the intimate conceptual connection between motivation and desire. And it presents a strong case for the Humean Theory of Motivation. I first examine the objections to Smith's argument from the possibility of 'besire' and 'motivated desire'. Then I propose an alternative argument against the Humean Theory and Smith's argument. I argue that some of the agent's desired goals can only be made sense of against the agent's relevant background beliefs about what these goals consist in. And these background beliefs function to determine or specify what the desired goal is rather than merely point out the means to the desired goal. So it is not the case that beliefs merely play a subsidiary role in motivation. Finally, I consider some possible objections to my argument.