Supererogation in Kant's Ethics (revised)

We often encounter individuals who not only strictly adhere to but also go beyond their ordinary moral obligations in ways that are morally commendable and admirable, such as sacrificing their own interests to help another. Such actions, referred to as supererogatory acts, are considered to possess a higher moral value than merely fulfilling ordinary moral obligations. However, these phenomena pose a challenge to Kant’s ethics. According to Kant, the sole source of moral value lies in acting from duty. How, then, can an action exceeding duty’s requirements possess a higher moral value? This paper explores three interpretive approaches Kant’s ethics could take in addressing these phenomena, including a fundamental denial of the moral value of supererogatory acts, characterizing the praise and admiration evoked by them through nonmoral values, finding a justification for the moral value of supererogatory acts within Kant’s concept of imperfect duties and basing the value on moral character and virtue. This paper supports and further elaborates on the final perspective, arguing that grounding the moral value of supererogatory acts in character and virtue not only aligns with Kant’s ethics but also offers a more comprehensive and intuitively satisfying account of their ethical significance.