Abstract
We often encounter individuals who not only strictly adhere to but also go beyond their general moral obligations in ways that are morally commendable and admirable, such as sacrificing their own interests to help another. Such actions are referred to as supererogatory acts and are considered to possess a higher moral value than the fulfillment of ordinary moral obligations. However, these phenomena would appear problematic for Kant’s ethics because, for Kant, the sole source of moral value lies in acting from duty—how can an action that goes beyond duty’s requirements attain a higher moral value? This paper explores several interpretive approaches Kant’s ethics could take in addressing this phenomenon, including a fundamental denial of the moral value of supererogatory acts, characterizing the praise and admiration evoked by them through nonmoral values, finding a justification for the moral value of supererogatory acts within Kant’s concept of imperfect duties and basing the value on moral character and virtue.