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Cocktail Security Scheme for Patching the Bus Vulnerability of Chiplet ICs
會議論文集

Cocktail Security Scheme for Patching the Bus Vulnerability of Chiplet ICs

Jui-Hsien Wang, Zheng-Hao Wang, Shi-Yu Huang 和 Chi-Kang Chen
2026 International VLSI Symposium on Technology, Systems and Applications (VLSI TSA), 頁碼.1-4
13/04/2026
Web of Science ID: WOS:001821316100130

摘要

Authorization Chiplet Communication Bus Data Encryption Design methodology Dies Encryption Hardware Hardware Security Hash functions Integrated circuits Printing Security Timing
In a modern chiplet-based IC, the communication bus wires are exposed to security attacks during assembly. It is susceptible that unauthorized circuits could be illegally inserted and attached to the communication bus to steal confidential information. As a result, extra security measures are needed to safeguard the information sent over the communication bus. However, existing crypto-hardware may introduce an area overhead too high for a small die. Considering this, we propose a security enhancement framework that is especially suited for the communication bus in a chiplet-based IC. Our framework mixes and matches multiple layers of simple yet effective security schemes, such as simple die authorization, salted hash function, XOR-based encryption and decryption, and Linear-Feedback Shift-Register (LFSR) based dynamic keys. Overall, it introduces a very low area overhead and only a 1-cycle performance penalty, and thus, is suitable for even a very small die while still providing adequate protection from illegally inserted dice.

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