摘要
How can we analyze and profile the behavior of a router malware? This is the motivating question behind our work focusing on router. Router-specific malware has emerged as a new vector for hackers, but has received relatively little attention compared to malware on other devices. A key challenge in analyzing router malware is getting it to activate, which is hampered by the diversity of firmware of various vendors and a plethora of different platforms. We propose, RARE, a systematic approach to analyze router malware and profile its behavior focusing on home-office routers. The key novelty is the intelligent augmented operation of our emulation that manages to fool malware binaries to activate irrespective of their target platform. This is achieved by leveraging two key capabilities: (a) a static level analysis that informs the dynamic execution, and (b) an iterative feedback loop across a series of dynamic executions, whose output informs the subsequent executions. From a practical point of view, RARE has the ability to: (a) instantiate an emulated router with or without malware, (b) replay arbitrary network traffic, (c) monitor and interact with the malware in a semi-automated way. We evaluate our approach using 221 router-specific malware binaries. First, we show that our method works: we get 94% of the binaries to activate, including obfuscated ones, which is a nine-fold increase compared to the 10% success ratio of the baseline method. Second, we show that our method can extract useful information towards understanding and profiling the botnet behavior: (a) we identify 203 unique IP addresses of C&C servers, and (b) we observe an initial spike and an overall 50% increase in the number of system calls on infected routers.