Abstract
Engaging an Internet channel and developing a store brand (SB) are important strategies for manufacturers and retailers to penetrate the market. Numerous researches have focused on the effects of Internet channels and SB products on supply chains, while few studies have discussed the interactions between Internet channels and SB products. This dissertation considers a supply chain with one manufacturer who sells a product to an independent retailer and may sell the product to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manufacturer’s product, the retailer may sell a substitutable product with different brand. Both the manufacturer and the retailer choose their own decision variables to maximize their respective profits. However, these strategies often lead to channel and brand conflicts. To improve the performance of the supply chain, the interest of revenue sharing contract has been increasing in supply chain management. The purpose of this dissertation is to find an optimal retail and wholesale prices, brand strategy and channel structure. Furthermore, this study provides corresponding management insights into how the revenue sharing contract affects the decisions. Nash and Stackelberg game models are formulated and used to represent the decision-making of the manufacturer and retailer. We also derive the corresponding existence and uniqueness conditions for equilibrium solutions. A sensitivity analysis of an optimal decision is conducted for the model parameters and the profits are compared for different scenario settings. The results demonstrate that it would benefit the manufacturer and the retailer to develop of the Internet channel and the SB product, respectively. Furthermore, cooperative strategies exist such that the manufacturer and retailer are beneficial mutually. In order to achieve a win-win outcome for the manufacturer and retailer, we find an optimal revenue sharing ratio and two Pareto zones of revenue sharing ratios, which are Pareto zone of SB and Pareto zone of Internet channel under which the threat of entries of SB and Internet channel could be alleviated. Based on the results, the managerial insights are brought up to account for the motivations of the entries of Internet channels and SB products in supply chains. Moreover, this study provides the coordinate mechanism of the revenue sharing contract for the managers who are interested in introducing an Internet channel or a SB product.