Abstract
The concept of disagreement payoff is very important in bargaining problem. Many literatures attempt to study how to determine bargainer's disagreement payoffs in a market. Szu-Wen Chou and Yang's theory shows that propoer (positive) disagreement payoffs generally can not be supported as a result of stable matching. In this paper, we extend Osborne and Rubinstein's bargaining model into 2 by 2 (two buyers and two sellers) case. We show that our model can be solved out a series of positive disagreement payoff. The purposes of this paper are to refine the core of the assignment game provided by Shapely and Shubik (1972) and to find a non-degenerated system of disagreement payoff. There are some examples provided in this paper explaining that such payoffs are usually stipulated to be zero-payoff for many buyers and sellers. It is difficult to find a non-degenerated system of disagreement payoffs as a general equilibrium. One goal of this paper is to contend with the difficulty by refining the core of Shapely and Shubik (1972).