Abstract
Grain and military salaries were always the main subjects of the frontier affairs in China. After the middle period of Wan-Li Era, the Ming government changed taxes and military pay from goods and materials to taels. In a later time, the Ren-Chen Japan-Korea War(1592-1598, 壬辰倭亂) and the Ming-Qing War which began in succession made military pay and salary the maximum expenditure of the Ming finance. In order to support the fight of resistance against aggression, the Ming court levied the Liao tax for military supplies and equipments with the amount of 2,000,000 taels in the beginning and 6,680,000 taels in the end of each year. Even the budget for defense reached to the height, the Ming troops still mutinied against their government incessantly because of the short of supplies. These mutinies implicated more financial crisis and personnel management fault. A historic transition of concern formed. There were eight successive mutinies taking place from the Ji Garrison to the Liaotung Peninsula in the early Chung-Zheng Era(1628-1633). The Ji Garrison and the region of Shan-Hai Pass, in the suburbs of Ming capital, Bejing, were frontline battlefields to resist the invasion of Jing Empire. These mutinies lighted up by soldiers all derived from a continued state of food provision exhaustion. Mutiny exerted its influence on the Ming troops to imitate violence and request salaries or other desires. After several times, other new factors had gradually permeated through the mutinies, like the General Liu family’s interests, the Pi Island Legion’s detestation of General Huang Long, and the provincialism problem between Liaotung and Shantung people. The internal disorders not only caused the Great Wall forts of Ming to sink in defense crisis, but also destroyed logistics bases or coastal fronts such as the whole Shantung Province seriously. The serial mutinies made the Ming Empire be in adverse circumstances day by day when it competed with its vigorous opponent, Qing. Finally, the combat zone of Bejing, Liaotung, and Shantung declined. Soldiers’ pay and provisions in Liaotung, the temporary tax not belonging to orthodox duties, were originally imposed on common people of Ming out of the Ming-Qing War. It was mainly put in use to support military expenditure in Bejing and Liaotung and would be repealed if the Ming troops successfully eliminated their enemy Qing or regained possession of lost territory of Liaotung. As 30 years went by, the Ming Court consistently failed to accomplish this important objective while the Liao tax became a regular practice and the foremost subject in finance. The taut revenues accompanying the huge defense budgets forced Chong-Zheng emporer to reduce the armed forces and urge all county magistrates to draw taxs in by validation system. Nearly half of every local annual appropriation was compulsorily handed in besides the central recenue. These policies influenced each other. Counties further lost their wealth and prosperity because of the floods and droughts, then Ming lost feelings of the citizenry. The Tian-Qi and Chung-Zheng Eras (1621-1644) were a critical time in the Ming-Qing War history. Sun, Cheng-Zong, Minister of Military and member of the cabinet, organized officials and assistants into a group in Shai-Hai Pass. They led the Ming troops from disordered retreat in defeat into a revived aspect, even recapturing their territory up to Jin Garrison. Many frustrated gentry secured official positions by expertise in Liaotung and so did Wei, Zhong-Xian and his henchmen. The latter were the big eunuch gang who usurped power for personal motives. Therefore, the parties struggling in Bejing court was enlarged with merits and achievements in the battlefrong. In this thesis, I research into the personnel relationship in Ji-Laio Area and give some examples to illustrate their work experience and qualifications, like Wang Ying-Xie, Bi Zhi-Su, Mao Yuan-Yi, and military officers commanded by them. With these investigations, we can realize the gentry’s ability to built a military society, then prove that anthropogenic source causes the degeneracy in finance and military of Ming Dynasty. In this thesis, the 36 volumes of “New Solider’s Pay” which were contained in the anthology “Du-Zhi-Zou-Yi” would be applied completely on the first take. Bi Zhi-Yan, the Minister of Finance in Chong-Zheng Court, wrote this anthology to report the state of taxation affairs to the throne. With those informations, we can confirm the Liao tax schedule and its estimated assessment, then to realize that it had been controlled once in the early Choug-Zheng Era but increased rapidly after the War of the Big Ling River. Since the Liao tax had its levy limit, ultimately the Ming Court couldn’t take financial deficits. The Ming-Qing War formed a strong demand to reform the finance of the Chong Zheng Court. In this fiscal restraing period, most central and local taxes were gathered and controlled by Bejing government, which paid much attention to bookkeeping and regular letter report. The final objective to stop the Liao tax and to restrain the growth of military expenditure was a fail because of the continuing presence of the Qing troops. Besides, floods and the insect pests of mass destruction also expanded the expenditures. This finance rally took measures to control funds as strict as the early Wang-Li Period, but few researchers had ever mentioned it. In the thesis, I try to excavate sober truth in order to explain the causal relation between the Liao tax and the Late-Ming’s finance.