Abstract
This article uses the 2002 and 2003 listing data of New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, Taiwan Stock Exchange, GreTai Securities Market, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The observation period is five years after the listing year. Measurable independent variables are chosen according to delisting regulations of each exchange, and panel data regression is used to study the impact of delisting regulations on the firms in the growth stage. As for the delisting regulations, with common law legal system, the regulations in the United States are more case-specific, objective, and having much more numerical standards. On the contrary, the regulations in Taiwan follow the civil law legal system. The delisting regulations in Taiwan do not differ across cases, and have many subjective judgments. The regulations in the Mainland China adopt Socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics. Despite the delisting regulations in the Mainland China are more concise, there is still much to improve. The empirical results show that at good times, the number of listing companies is larger, but the ratio of delisting companies in five years is also higher; more loosen delisting regulations correspond to higher survival rate, but the sales growth rate, asset growth rate, and profitability ratio are not necessarily higher. Therefore, the exchanges adopting loosen delisting regulations do not produce the incentive to make the firms in the growth stage to have better performance. Furthermore, having regulations on market value and profitability would contribute to raise the firms’ sales growth rate, asset growth rate, and profitability ratio.