Abstract
Along with the cost structure and technological change of the telephone network, the telecom market was no longer a natural monopoly and the telecoms liberalization was taken. However, there are still some entry barriers preventing from competition. In order to create the competition in the telecom market, regulators have to require those operators with significant market power to lease their network elements, also called network elements unbundling, to the others without that power. Hope that the latter could step on the equal position to the former. Regulators recognize the transition characteristic of asymmetric regulation, and anticipate that it will be non-necessary when competition fulfill the market. At that time, the competition structure could replace the regulation one. Though, it seems that the network elements unbundling is no longer transitive during these time, and the regulatory necessity of unbundled access is not reviewed any more. Therefore, we examine the regulation structure by comparing the Telecommunication Act of R.O.C. and United States. Eventually, we make two conclusions. First, we should clearly identify with the aim to the facilities-based competition. Second, we should establish the rules about de-regulation of network elements unbundling. Around the unbundling copper local loop, existing entry barriers, we have to review the regulatory necessity of unbundled access and transit the facilities-free to facilities-based competition gradually. However, around the unbundling fiber local loop, without entry barriers, we had better to de-regulate the unbundling and encourage operators to install infrastructure.