Abstract
Abstract In her book, The Ontology of Mind, Helen Steward claims that in contemporary philosophy of mind, the concept of network model of causation, which many philosophers often adopt to explore mind-body problem, should be rejected. Steward argues that there are two kinds of metaphysical confusion built in the network model. One treats token state as particular in ontology. The other treats causal relevance as causing in causality. Based on the network model, many issues are derived, e.g. “mental states are physical sates”, “mental states should be eliminated”, and “the problem how to account for the efficacy of mental properties”. Steward’s critique demonstrates that ignoring the difference between event and state has been a serious mistake in contemporary philosophy of mind. This mistake has brought about not only misunderstandings of the metaphysical character of state but many unnecessary implications. In this thesis, Steward’s argument will be further illuminated to show that event and state have different ontological status and causal role, and, moreover, that correctly grasping metaphysics of mind is important in dealing with the mind-body problem. Keyword: H. Steward, D. Davidson, Causation, Network Model of Causation, Token State, Particular, Mind-Body Problem.