Abstract
In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl has showed us the structure of the theory of intersubjectivity. In this thesis, I focus on the concept of the primordial sphere to analyze the theoretical presuppositions and this implication of the theoretical problems. I have raised three main questions: (1) would it be possibly successful, that we could exclude out the non-alienness to achieve the pure ownness sphere? (2) The primordial sphere, which was firstly made by abstract epoché, would be a justifying concept of the explication of the theoretical foundation. But in the step of the constitutional analysis of the other, the sphere of ownness turns into a monad in the primordial sphere. In this way, is the primordial sphere a justifying concept or an ontological concept? (3) Concerning the theme of the other, could Husserl thoroughly explicate the experience of countering the other by the method which is from the explication of the ego to the explication of the existence of the other? In my thesis, in order to deal with the questions, I have distinguished the concept of the primordial sphere into the concept of static phenomenology and of the genetic phenomenology. From my discussions I have made three conclusions: (1) in static phenomenology, the claim, that the sphere of ownness should exclude all of the alienness, fails. (2) in genetic phenomenology, the primordial sphere, which is achieved by the self-explication, contravene the attitude of phenomenological research. (3) the methodology from the ego to the other receives the motivation from the project of the foundation of knowledge, which looks for the radical philosophical ground in the evidence of apodicticity. .