Abstract
This master’s thesis originates from an attention to a delicate interpretation: In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, his classic work of interpretation of Kant’s first Critique, Allison claimed that the hypothetical use of reason in the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic” is identical to induction. In my perspective, this interpretation would be incoherent with the overall understanding of first Critique. The hypothetical use of reason and the induction are similar in their process of searching the universal but essentially different in their natures. To regard these two as identical merely based on their similarity in the process is to neglect the nature and the significance of the hypothetical use of reason. Furthermore, the systematic unity plays a crucial role in the hypothetical employment of reason: together they form a purposive systems in which the particular is arranged according to purpose. Therefore, I restate my position that the hypothetical use of reason is not identical to induction. In this thesis, respective analysis of the induction, the hypothetical use of reason, and the systematic unity along with their correlation would be carried out in order to present an alternate interpretation in response to Allison’s perspective.