Abstract
In this master’s thesis I examine Mark Rowlands’ thesis of Amalgamated Mind. First of all, Rowlands defenses the thesis of Amalgamated Mind against many criticisms by offering a cognitive criterion with four conditions. The fourth condition of the cognitive criterion aims to answer the problem of cognitive bloat. Rowlands claims to solve the problem of cognitive bloat by means of the idea of “integration” and the distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of cognitive processes. Rowlands argues that his thesis of Amalgamated Mind indeed expands the cognitive domain, but that this expansion is allowed only under certain conditions and is benign. I propose two objections to Rowlands’ cognitive criterion, and argue that these two objections are serious. But I then develop a way to answer these two objections and thereby reinforce Rowlands’ position. But with respect to the problem of cognitive bloat, I argue that there exist certain complicated situations involving cognitive bloat which Rowlands’ cognitive criterion cannot handle properly, and that his cognitive criterion thus needs more clarifications and supplements.