Abstract
This thesis attempts to clarify the relationship between Quine’s inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity. To this end, in chapter one I expound naturalism in Quine’s philosophy, his linguistic behaviorism, and the standard of perceptual similarity regarded by Quine as the basis of all learning; in chapter two I show Quine’s views of reference and ontology, and how these two notions are connected to each other by expounding the psychogenesis of reference and the criterion of ontological commitment proposed by Quine; in chapter three I first expound the argument from the thought experiment of radical translation and the proof by proxy function for these two theses, then I reveal why Quine thought that there is no technical difference between inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity; in the final chapter I discuss the opinions about inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity from some philosophers, which include Paul Roth, Edward Becker, Berit Brogaard, and Otávio Bueno. I also discuss the relationship of Quine’s inscrutability of reference, ontological relativity, the criterion of ontological commitment, underdetermination of scientific theory by evidence, and ontological relativism. Keywords: Quine, inscrutability of reference, ontological relativity, reification, radical translation, proxy function, psychogenesis of reference, criterion of ontological commitment