Abstract
Given that both standard setting takes place often and patents proliferate in the information and communication technology (“ICT”) sector, how to deal with the tension between standard implementers and standard-essential patent (“SEP”) holders and the issues of patent-holdup and royalty stacking becomes top priority for standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) . To manage this tension, SSOs have generally adopted patent policies requiring their members to disclose SEPs and commit to license their SEPs on a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) license. However, the content of FRAND remains ambiguous and necessary regulation is lacking, a growing amount of litigation is flooding many jurisdictions. The key issues of these litigation mostly focus on three areas: first, the appropriate legal basis for standard implementers to claim a FRAND rate against SEP holders; second, the methods for calculating reasonable royalties; and third, the rules for granting injunctions. As litigation concerning SEPs and FRAND spread globally, we must pay greater attention to the laws and approaches adopted by the US, European Union, Japan, and People's Republic of China. Accordingly, this thesis discusses issues that might arise in Taiwan based on comparative study. In essence, this thesis argues that FRAND commitment is a third-party beneficiary contract; the method for calculating reasonable royalties is comparable benchmarking; and injunction should be granted only when the standard implementer refuses to accept a FRAND license.