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A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling
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A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling

C.Y. Cyrus Chu
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 卷.263(2), 頁碼.219-226
03/2010
PMID: 19962386

摘要

Handicap theory Incentive compatibility Individual rationality Sex selection Signaling equilibrium Statistics and Probability,Modeling and Simulation,Biochemistry Genetics and Molecular Biology (all),Immunology and Microbiology (all),Agricultural and Biological Sciences (all),Applied Mathematics
The males of many species (such as peacocks) develop excessively large traits, which appear to interfere with their agility and hence survival probability. Moreover, it is also observed that females seem to prefer mating males with such clumsy traits. Zahavi (1975) proposed a handicap theory to explain this phenomenon, suggesting that this trait/preference interaction is a way in which strong males can signal their viability by yielding a handicap in terms of a clumsy trait size. This paper presents a two-sex model of selfish genes that generates this particular male-female interaction, and characterizes the conditions behind a handicap equilibrium. We first show the female dominance result of Bateman (1948) in this two-sex model, and then specify the relevant equilibrium conditions, including the incentive compatibility condition for females, the individual rationality condition for males, and the stability condition of population composition. Identifying these conditions helps us understand the various features of the searching/signaling of sex selection in evolution. © 2009 Elsevier Ltd.

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