摘要
With its proposal of the “double carbon” (peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neu-tralization) goal, China has entered a new stage in creating an ecological civilization and achieving sustainable development. Based on the formation and evolution mechanism of the carbon emission efficiency network, in this study, a trilateral evolutionary game model—including efficiency groups (high-and low-efficiency groups) and local governments—was constructed, in an attempt to discuss the conditions needed for different players and trilateral interconnected systems to implement bal-anced and stable strategies. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the participants’ evolutionary trajectories toward factors such as the initial strategy ratio, transition cost, and network capital were tested via a system simulation. The main conclusions were as follows: (1) Efficiency groups form a virtuous circle when the initial proportion of the participants’ strategies reaches a certain threshold, and con-verge into a stable “win–win” state. Under these circumstances, high-efficiency groups tend to give full play to their efficiency advantages in terms of carbon emission reduction and green develop-ment, while low-efficiency groups tend to choose green transformation and accept the spillover effect from high-efficiency groups. (2) When efficiency groups achieve a “win–win” state or form good self-management, local governments move from active supervision to a passive supervision strategy in order to reduce supervision costs. (3) While different initial strategy proportions do not affect the stable convergence point of the evolutionary system, they have a differentiated impact on the convergence speed of the players. Under the condition of a low initial strategy ratio, transformation costs can reduce the green transformation enthusiasm of inefficient groups, while network capital can enhance the green transformation willingness of inefficient groups.