摘要
How do public agencies manage diverse programs under limited budgets? Resource constraints force agencies to prioritize tasks, requiring strategic decisions about how to allocate resources effectively. In this article, I develop a game-theoretical model that explores how agencies shape and restructure their task portfolios under budgetary constraints. In response to budget reductions, I argue that agencies reallocate resources by prioritizing more efficient tasks for improved performance within their portfolios. To test my theoretical claims, I analyze an original dataset of antitrust cases filed by the US Antitrust Division (AD) from 1970 to 2019. Using compositional analysis, I find systematic associations between budgetary changes and the AD's litigation portfolios. Specifically, budget cuts are associated with a higher share of antitrust criminal cases-the most efficient type for improving performance metrics-and with relatively lower shares for other case types. This study offers new insight into how public agencies navigate budgetary constraints to achieve their public missions while meeting performance expectations.