摘要
ObjectiveWhen and why do U.S. leaders visit their allies or adversaries? Much of the literature on diplomatic visits treats each visit as an independent observation. In this article, we analyze high-level diplomatic visits as compositional data based on the assumption that they are scarce political resources.MethodsWe conduct a compositional analysis of U.S. high-level officials' diplomatic visits between 1950 and 2010.ResultsWe find that U.S. diplomatic visits to its allies are defense-oriented, so leaders spend more time touring them during their security crises to signal reassurance. Additionally, we find that visits to adversaries are motivated by leaders' domestic political concerns, particularly their high public unpopularity. Visiting a hostile country is a challenging and salient foreign policy task, providing a high-profile opportunity to improve their domestic image and standing. This effect is particularly significant in a divided government, where leaders turn to foreign policy to maximize domestic political impacts amid domestic gridlock.ConclusionThe findings suggest that U.S. leaders travel to allies and adversaries for distinct strategic purposes. Furthermore, our study suggests that future research on diplomatic visits should use a compositional variable approach to better model the dynamics and competitive nature of travel diplomacy.