Abstract
How does mind communicate with the world-i.e., how do we position mind in the world? Western mainstream philosophers have been perplexed by the problem for more than three hundred years. The aim of this article is to suggest, from the perspective of scientific practice in context, to take a detour to deal with the problem. First, the article considers how philosophers of science propose their explanation about the nature of scientific practice-including scientific discovery and judgment in scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the article explores the so-called ?concept of contextualized evidence? and ?imperfect procedure of judgment? and their relevance to scientific discovery and judgment. Finally, on the basis of the general account gleaned from the previous two sections, a case from moral inquiry and judgment is explored to further illustrate that, by conducting moral inquiry and judgment in the domain where they inhabit, human beings themselves can show-by this very practice of inquiry and judgment-that human mind indeed has its place in the natural world.