真相委員會承接機制的類型與國際實踐

This paper explores the institutional type and global practice of follow-up mechanisms for truth commissions. This paper also examines the performance of the current follow-up mechanism after the Commission for Promoting Transitional Justice in Taiwan (TJC) was dissolved in May 2022. Regarding the institutional advantages and disadvantages of the follow-up mechanisms, this paper argues that the National Human Rights Commission and other independent human rights institutions established outside the existing administrative body has more autonomy but weaker administrative coordination and resources. Conversely, an interministerial or single administrative body would have better administrative resources. However, such a mechanism would face institutional challenges if the ruling party was indifferent to transitional justice. Moreover, adopting a parliamentary committee as the follow-up mechanism is usually associated with a higher degree of democratic legitimacy; however, this arrangement carries several political risks. If most congressional representatives belong to political parties different from the ruling government, the parliamentary committee will encounter institutional difficulties and resource shortages despite political polarization. In Taiwan, after the dissolution of the TJC, the prime minister chaired the transitional justice board, with assistance of the division for human rights and transitional justice. Additionally, transitional justice programs were assigned to the various ministries. In terms of institutional advantages, this paper argues that this arrangement makes it easier to receive administrative or political resources. However, doubts remain, such as whether transitional justice is susceptible to regime change and related policies and measures cannot be realized due to lacking systematic implementation. Hence, this paper argues the government should consider establishing a new institution to coordinate the implementation of transitional justice matters. Additionally, this paper argues that the National Human Rights Commission should actively exercise its supervisory function to monitor follow-up mechanism. In addition, the civic groups also should actively monitor the implementation of transitional justice policy.